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Abstract
Private regression has received attention from both database and security communities. Recent
work by Fredrikson et al. (USENIX Security 2014) analyzed the functional mechanism (Zhang et al.
VLDB 2012) for training linear regression models over medical data. Unfortunately, they found that
model accuracy is already unacceptable with differential privacy when ε = 5. We address this issue,
presenting an explicit connection between differential privacy and stable learning theory through which
a substantially better privacy/utility tradeoff can be obtained. Perhaps more importantly, our theory
reveals that the most basic mechanism in differential privacy, output perturbation, can be used to obtain
a better tradeoff for all convex-Lipschitz-bounded learning tasks. Since output perturbation is simple to
implement, it means that our approach is potentially widely applicable in practice. We go on to apply it
on the same medical data as used by Fredrikson et al. Encouragingly, we achieve accurate models even
for ε = 0.1. In the last part of this paper, we study the impact of our improved differentially private
mechanisms on model inversion attacks, a privacy attack introduced by Fredrikson et al. We observe
that the improved tradeoff makes the resulting differentially private model more susceptible to inversion
attacks. We analyze this phenomenon formally.
1 Introduction
Differential-private data analytics has received considerable attention from the data management commu-
nity [16, 19, 31, 32]. This paper focuses on regression models, which are widely used to extract valuable
data patterns in “sensitive” domains. For example, in personalized medicine, linear regression models are
commonly used to predict medication dosages [14] and other useful features [6, 21]. For such scenarios,
individuals’ privacy has become a major concern and learning with differential privacy (DP) is particularly
desirable.
Differentially private regression, and more generally private convex learning, has been intensively studied
in recent years by researchers from the data management, security, and theory communities [3, 5, 7, 11, 15, 33].
One notable contribution is the functional mechanism, proposed by Zhang et al. [33], which is a practical
mechanism for training differentially-private regression models. Several research groups [1, 29, 30] have
adopted the functional mechanism as a basic building block in their study and initial empirical results are
promising.
Our starting point is recent work by Fredrikson et al. [11], which used the functional mechanism to train
differentially-private linear regression models to predict doses of a medicine called warfarin from patients’
genomic traits. Unfortunately, they found that the model accuracy was unacceptable with ε-DP — even for
ε as high as 5. One of the main goals of this paper is to develop a suitable theory which allows mechanisms
based on simple techniques such as output perturbation to obtain accurate, differentially-private models at
reasonable private levels (e.g., ε = 0.1).
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To this end, we start by presenting an explicit and precise connection between differential privacy and
stability theory in computational learning. Specifically, in the setting of learning, we show that differential
privacy is essentially another stability definition, yet it is so strong that it implies previous stability definitions
in the learning literature. Combining this observation with some machinery from stable learning theory, we
give an analysis showing that simple mechanisms such as output perturbation can learn every convex-
Lipschitz-bounded problem with strong differential privacy guarantees.
Our analysis has several advantages over previous work. First, it relaxes the technical conditions required
by Chaudhuri et al. [5]. In particular, we do not require the loss function to be smooth or differentiable.
Second, our analysis reveals that output perturbation can be used to obtain a much better privacy/utility
tradeoff than the functional mechanism. Under the same technical conditions, we achieve the same tradeoff
between differential privacy and generalization error as that recently proved by Bassily et al. [3], while
avoiding use of the exponential mechanism [22] and the sophisticated sampling sub-procedure used by Bassily
et al. [3]. This makes our approach widely-applicable in practical settings.
We then apply our theory to linear regression models, for which we notice that the functional mechanism
is the state-of-the-art approach being applied in the literature [1, 11, 29]. Our mechanisms are regularized
versions of least squares optimization. In contrast to the functional mechanism, where regularization is a
heuristic, regularization is crucial for our theoretical guarantee.
Regularization adds additional parameters that need to be picked carefully in order to maintain DP. A
standard approach used in related contexts is to employ a private parameter tuning algorithm [5] to select
a set of parameters that depends on the training data. We have implemented this approach to parameter
tuning and refer to the mechanisms using it as the privately-tuned mechanisms in our empirical study. We
also consider a different approach, based on our proof of generalization error, that picks the parameters in a
data independent manner.
We evaluate both approaches using the same data and experimental methodology used by Fredrikson
et al. [11]. The results are encouraging — both approaches produce substantially more accurate models
than the functional mechanism of Zhang et al. [33]. Specifically, two tuned mechanisms obtain accurate
models with ε-DP for ε = 0.3. Interestingly, the data-independent mechanism significantly outperforms the
tuned ones for small ε and obtains accurate models even for ε = 0.1! Finally, using the same simulation
approach described by Fredrikson et al. [11], we note that as compared to the functional mechanism, our
methods induce significantly smaller risk of mortality, bleeding and stroke, especially when compared at
small ε settings.
Our results described thus far are positive, and follow in the tradition of a large body of research on
differential privacy, which seeks to improve utiltiy/privacy tradeoffs for various problems of interest. However,
Fredrikson et al. [11] did not only consider differential privacy, they also considered an attack they term model
inversion. As a simple example, consider a machine learning model w that takes features x1, . . . , xd and
produces a prediction y. A model-inversion (MI) attack takes input x1, . . . , xd−1 and a value y′ that is
related to y, and tries to predict xd (thus “inverting the model”). For example, in [11], the authors consider
the case where xd is a genetic marker, y is the warfarin dosage, and x1, . . . , xd−1 are general background
information such as height and weight. They used an MI attack to predict an individual’s genetic markers
based on his or her warfarin dosage, thus violating that individual’s privacy.
In the final part of our paper, we consider the impact of our improved privacy-utility tradeoff on MI
attacks. Here our results are less positive: in improving the privacy-utility tradeoff, we have increased the
effectiveness of MI attacks. While unintended, upon deeper reflection this is not surprising: simply put, the
improved privacy-utility tradeoff results in less noise added, and less noise added means the model is easier
to invert. We formalize this discussion and prove that this phenomenon is quite general, and not an artifact
of our approach or this specific learning task.
What this means for privacy is an open question. If one “only cares” about differential privacy, then the
increased susceptibility to MI attacks is irrelevant. However, if one believes that MI attacks are significant
(and anecdotal evidence suggests that some medical professionals are concerned about MI attacks), then
the fact that improved differential privacy can mean worse MI exposure warrants further study. In this
direction, our work indeed extends a long line of work that discusses the interaction of DP and attribute
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privacy [18, 20, 23], and gives a realistic application where misconceptions about DP can lead to unwanted
disclosure. It is our hope that our work might highlight this issue and stimulate more discussion.
Our technical contributions can be summarized as follows:
• We give an explicit connection between differential privacy and stability theory in machine learning. We
show that differential privacy is essentially a strong stability notion that implies well-known previous
notions.
• Moreover, combining this connection with some machinery from stability theory, we prove that the
simple output perturbation mechanism can learn every convex-Lipschitz-bounded learning problems
with strong differential privacy. Our analysis relaxes the technical conditions required by Chaudhuri et
al. [5], achieves the same tradeoff between DP and generalization error as proved by Bassily et al. [3],
and is much simpler than both analyses.
• Since output perturbation is one of the simplest mechanisms to implement, it means that our method
is widely applicable in practice. We go on to apply the theory to linear regression. We present and
analyze regularized variants of linear regression, and give a detailed description on how to privately
select parameters for regularization.
• We perform a re-evaluation, using the same medical data set and experimental methodology as previous
work [11], comparing the functional mechanism with our mechanisms to train linear regression models.
Encouragingly, we observe a substantially better tradeoff between differential privacy and utility.
• We perform a re-evaluation of model inversion in the same medical data analysis setting, and demon-
strate that as we improve differentially-private mechanisms, MI attacks become more problematic. We
provide a theoretical explanation of this phenomenon.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we present background knowledge that will
facilitate our discussion later. Next we present the connection between differential privacy and stability
theory in Section 3, and discuss the applications in Section 4. In Section 5, we compare output perturbation
and the functional mechanism with respect to the privacy-utility or model-inversion efficacy tradeoff. Finally,
Section 6 discusses related work and in Section 7, we provide concluding remarks.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we present some background in three different areas: learning theory, convex optimization and
differential privacy. We will only cover some basics of these areas to facilitate our discussion later. Readers
are referred to [4], [10] and [24] for an in-depth introduction to these three topics, respectively.
2.1 Learning Theory
Let X be a feature space, Y be an output space, and Z = X × Y be a sample space. For example, Y is a
set of labels for classification, or an interval in R for regression. Let H be a hypothesis space and ` be an
instance-wise loss function, such that on an input hypothesis w ∈ H and a sample z ∈ Z, it gives a loss
`(w, z).
Let D be a distribution over Z, the goal of learning is to find a hypothesis w ∈ H so as to minimize
its generalization error (or true loss), which is defined to be LD(w) = Ez∼D[`(w, z)]. The minimum gen-
eralization error achievable over H is denoted as L∗D = minw∈H LD(w). In learning, D is unknown but we
are given a training set S = {z1, . . . , zn} drawn i.i.d. from D. The empirical loss function is defined to be
LS(w) =
1
n
∑n
i=1 `(w, zi).
We are ready to define learnability. Our definition follows Shalev-Shwartz et al. [26] which defines
learnability in the Generalized Learning Setting considered by Haussler [13]. This definition also directly
generalizes PAC learnability [27].
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Definition 1 (Learnability). A problem is called agnostically learnable with rate ε(n, δ) : N× (0, 1) 7→ (0, 1)
if there is a learning rule A : Zn 7→ H such that for any distribution D over Z, given n ∈ N and δ ∈ (0, 1),
with probability 1 − δ over S ∼ Dn, LD(A(S)) ≤ L∗D + ε(n, δ). Moreover, we say that the problem is
agnostically learnable if for any δ ∈ (0, 1), ε(n, δ) vanishes to 0 as n tends to infinity.
We stress that in this definition, the generalization error holds universally for every distribution D on
the data.Intuitively, this definition says that given a confidence parameter δ and a sample size n, the learned
hypothesis A(S) is ε(n, δ) close to the best achievable. Note that ε(n, δ) measures the rate we converge to the
optimal. Throughout this paper, we will use the generalization error as the utility measure of a hypothesis
w. Naturally, the utility of a hypothesis is high if its generalization error is small.
In the above, the learning rule A is deterministic in the sense that it maps a training set deterministically
to a hypothesis in H. We will also talk about randomized learning rules, which maps a training set to a
distribution over H. More formally, a randomized learning rule A˜ takes the form Zn 7→ D(H), where
D(H) is the set of probability distributions over H. The empirical risk of A˜ on a training item z is defined
as `(A˜(S), z) = Ew∼A˜(S)[`(w, z)]. The empirical risk of A˜ on a training set S is defined as LS(A˜(S)) =
Ew∼A˜(S)[LS(w)]. Finally, we define the generalization error of A˜ as LD(A˜(S)) = Ew∼A˜(S)[LD(w)]. In short,
we take expectation over the randomness of A˜.
Stability Theory. Stability theory is a sub-theory in machine learning (see, for example, Chapter 13 of [24]
for a gentle survey of this area). As we will see, more stable a learning rule is, better DP-utility tradeoff we
can achieve in a private learning. To discuss stability, we need to define “change of input data set.” We will
use the following definition.
Definition 2 (Replace-One Operation). For a training set S, i ∈ [n] and z′ ∈ Z, we define S(i,z′) to be the
training set obtained by replacing zi by z
′. In other words,
S = {z1, . . . , zi−1, zi, zi+1, . . . , zn},
S(i,z
′) = {z1, . . . , zi−1, z′, zi+1, . . . , zn}.
Moreover, we write S(i) instead of S(i,z
′) if z′ is clear from the context.
Informally, a learning rule A is stable if A(S) and A(S(i)) are “close” to each other. There are many
possible ways to formulate what does it mean by “close.” We will discuss the following definition, which is
the strongest stability notion defined by Shalev-Shwartz et al. [26].
Definition 3 (Strongly-Uniform-RO Stability [26]). A (possibly randomized) learning rule A is strongly-
uniform-RO stable with rate εstable(n), if for all training sets S of size n, for all i ∈ [n], and all z′, z¯ ∈ Z, it
holds that |`(A(S(i)), z¯)− `(A(S), z¯)| ≤ εstable(n).
Intuitively, this definition captures the following property of a good learning algorithm A: if one changes
any one training item in the training set S to get S′, the two hypotheses computed by A from S and S′,
namely A(S) and A(S′), will be “close” to each other (here “close” means that for any instance z¯ sampled
from D, the loss of A(S) and A(S′) on z¯ are close).
A fundamental result on learnability and stability, proved recently by Shalev-Shwartz et al. [26], states
the following,
Theorem 4 ([26], informal). Consider any learning problem in the generalized learning setting as proposed
by Vapnik [28]. If the problem is learnable, then it can be learned by a (randomized) rule that is strongly-
uniform-RO stable.
Qualitatively, this theorem says that learnability and stability are equivalent. That is, every problem that
is learnable can be learned stably (under strongly-uniform-RO stability). In the context of differential privacy,
this indicates that for any learnable problem one might hope to achieve a good DP-utility tradeoff. However,
quantitatively the situation is much more delicate: as we will see later, strongly-uniform-RO stability is
somewhat too weak to lead to a differential privacy guarantee without additional assumptions.
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2.2 Convex Optimization
We will need the following basic concepts from convex optimization. Let H be a closed convex set equipped
with a norm ‖ · ‖. A set H is R-bounded if ‖x‖ ≤ R for any x ∈ H. A function f : H 7→ R is convex if for
every u, v ∈ H, and α ∈ (0, 1) we have
f(αu+ (1− α)v) ≤ αf(u) + (1− α)f(v).
Moreover, f is λ-strongly convex if instead
f(αu+ (1− α)v) ≤ αf(u) + (1− α)f(v)
− λ
2
α(1− α)‖u− v‖2.
A function f : H 7→ R is ρ-Lipschitz if for any u, v ∈ H, |f(u)− f(v)| ≤ ρ‖u− v‖. Let H be a closed convex
set in Rd. A differentiable function f : H 7→ R is β-smooth if its gradient ∇f is β-Lipschitz (note that ∇f
is a d-dimensional vector valued function). That is, ‖∇f(u)−∇f(v)‖ ≤ β‖u− v‖. We will use the following
property of strongly convex functions. It says that any convex function can be turned into a strongly convex
one by adding to it a strongly convex function.
Lemma 5 ([4]). If f is λ-strongly convex and g is convex then (f + g) is λ-strongly convex.
2.3 Differential Privacy
Given two databases D,D′ of size n, we say that they are neighboring if they differ in at most one tuple.
We define bounded ε-differential privacy.
Definition 6 (Bounded Differential Privacy).
A mechanism M is called bounded ε-differentially private, if for any neighboring D,D′, and any event
E ⊆ Range(M), Pr[M(D) ∈ E] ≤ eε Pr[M(D′) ∈ E].
This is called “bounded” differential privacy because the guarantee is over databases of size n. Note
that all previous work in differentially private learning is for bounded differential privacy [3, 5, 33]. Dwork,
McSherry, Nissim and Smith [8] provide an output perturbation method for ensuring differential privacy.
This method is based on estimating the “sensitivity” of a query, defined as follows.
Definition 7. Let q be a query that maps a database to a vector in Rd. The `2-sensitivity of q is defined to
be
∆2(q) = max
D∼D′
‖q(D)− q(D′)‖2.
Note that we are using the 2-norm sensitivity instead of the usual 1-norm. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 8 ([8]). Let q be a query that maps a database to a vector in Rd. Then publishing q(D) +κ where
κ is sampled from the distribution with density
p(κ) ∝ exp
(
− ε
∆2(q)
‖κ‖2
)
ensures ε-differential privacy.
Importantly, the `2-norm of the noise vector, ‖κ‖2, is distributed according to a Gamma distribution
Γ
(
d, ∆2(q)ε
)
. We have the following fact about Gamma distributions:
Theorem 9 ([5]). For the noise vector κ, we have that with probability at least 1− γ, ‖κ‖2 ≤ d ln(d/γ)∆2(q)ε .
5
2.4 Our Setting
In this paper, we will work in the same setting as in [3], where we assume the instance-wise loss function `
to be convex and Lipschitz. As we will see later, both conditions are crucial for achieving a good tradeoff
between privacy and utility. We stress that both the convexity and Lipschitzness conditions here are only
with respect to w. In other words, we only require `(w, z) to be convex and Lipschitz in w (for any fixed
z ∼ D at a time). Note also that, differing from Chaudhuri et al. [5], we do not need ` to be differentiable
in w. Finally, we will focus on ε-differential privacy. Our results readily extend to (ε, δ)-differential privacy
by using a different noise distribution (e.g. Gaussian distribution) in output perturbation.
3 Differential Privacy and Stability Theory
In this section we present our results on the connection between differential privacy and stability theory.
Our technical results can be summarized as follows:
DP implies Strongly-Uniform-RO Stability. In Section 3.1, we show that, in the setting of learning,
differential privacy is a strong stability notion that implies strongly-uniform-RO stability. Strongly-Uniform-
RO stability is the strongest stability notion proposed by Shalev-Shwartz et al. [26] from learning theory.
Norm Stability implies DP. In Section 3.2, we give a stability notion, `2-RO stability, that leads to
differential privacy by injecting a small amount of noise. `2-RO stability is used implicitly in [25] to prove
learnability of convex-Lipschitz-bounded problems under the condition that the instance loss function is
smooth. Our analysis removes this requirement.
Simpler Mechanism with the Same Generalization Error. In recent work, Bassily et al. [3] give tight
bounds (for both training and generalization errors) for differentially privately learning convex-Lipschitz-
bounded problems. Their mechanisms require the exponential mechanism and a sophisticated sampling
subprocedure. We show in Section 3.3 that the elementary output perturbation mechanism presented in [5]
can give the same tradeoff between differential privacy and generalization error (however with weaker training
error) for every convex-Lipschitz-bounded learning problem. Our proof relaxes the technical requirements
of [5] (smoothness), and is significantly simpler than both [3, 5].
3.1 Differential Privacy is a Stability Notion
If one writes out the definition of bounded differential privacy (Definition 6) in the language of learning, it
becomes: a learning rule A is ε-differentially private if, for all training set S of size n, for all i ∈ [n], and all
z′ ∈ Z, and any event E, it holds that Pr[A(S) ∈ E] ≤ eε Pr[A(S(i)) ∈ E], where the probability is taken over
the randomness of A. When we contrast this definition with strongly-uniform-RO stability (Definition 3),
the only difference is that the latter considers a particular type of event, namely for z¯ ∈ Z, the magnitude of
`(A˜(S), z¯). At this point, it is somewhat clear that differential privacy is essentially (yet another) stability
notion. Nevertheless, it is so strong that it implies strongly-uniform-RO stability, as shown in the following:
Proposition 10. Suppose that |`(·, ·)| ≤ B. Let ε > 0 and A be a randomized learning rule. If A is ε-
differentially private, then it is strongly-uniform-RO stable with rate εstable ≤ B(eε − 1). Specifically, for
ε ∈ (0, 1), this is approximately Bε.
Two remarks are in order. First, this implication holds without assuming anything on the loss function
` except for boundedness. Second, one may note that the converse of this proposition, however, is not true
in general. For example, consider the case where ` is a constant function and A(S) = h1 6= h2 = A(S(i)).
Then A is strongly-uniform-RO stable (with rate 0!) yet it is clearly not differentially private. Moreover,
this example indicates that, even if strongly-uniform-RO stability has been achieved, one cannot hope for
differential privacy by adding a “small amount” of noise to the output of A. This is because h1 and h2 can
be arbitrarily far away from each other so the sensitivity of A cannot be bounded. This motivates us to
define another stability notion for the purpose of differential privacy.
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3.2 Norm Stability and Noise for DP
In this section we present a different stability notion that does lead to differential privacy by injecting a small
amount of noise. We then use some machinery from stability theory to quantify the amount of noise needed.
Following our discussion above, a natural idea now is that A(S) and A(S(i)) shall be close by themselves,
rather than being close under the evaluation of some functions. Because the output of A lies in H, which is
a normed space1 as long as perturbation on ), a “universal” notion for closeness is that A(S) and A(S(i))
are close in norm. This leads to the following definition.
Definition 11 (`2-RO Stability). A learning rule A is `2-RO stable with rate ε(n), if for any S ∼ Dn,
z′ ∼ D and i ∈ [n], ‖A(S(i))−A(S)‖2 ≤ ε(n).
Astute readers may realize that this is nothing more than a rephrasing of the `2-sensitivity of a query
(Definition 7). Thus, in the spirit of the output perturbation method mentioned in Section 2.3, if one can
bound `2-RO stability, then we only need to inject a small amount of noise for differential privacy.
If A is `2-RO stable, then adding a small amount of noise to its output ensures differential privacy,
and thus strongly-uniform-RO stability. However, without the Lipschitz condition, the resulting hypothesis
might be useless. This is because a small distance (in `2-norm) to A(S) could give significant change in loss.
This presents a barrier for proving learnability for the private mechanism. Thus in the following, we will
restrict ourselves back to the setting discussed in Section 2.4 where we assume that ` is convex and Lipschitz
(in w).
We now move on to quantifying the amount of noise needed for differential privacy. Specifically, we will
show that for strongly-convex learning tasks, the “scale of the noise” we need is roughly only Od,ε(1/n)
where n is the training set size (the big-O notation hides a constant that depends on the number of features
d, and the DP parameter ε.). This means that as training set size increases, the noise we need vanishes
to zero for a fixed model and ε-DP. By contrast, for the functional mechanism, the “scale of the noise” is
Od,ε(1). The following two lemmas are due to Shalev-Shwartz et al. [25]. We include their proofs in the
appendix for completeness.
Lemma 12 (Exchanging Lemma). Let A be a learning rule such that A(S) = arg minw ϑS(w), where
ϑS(w) = LS(w) + %(w) and %(w) is a regularizer. For any S ∼ Dn, i ∈ [n] and z′ ∼ D,
ϑS(u)− ϑS(v) ≤ `(v, z
′)− `(u, z′)
n
+
`(u, zi)− `(v, zi)
n
,
where u = A(S(i)) and v = A(S).
Intuitively, this lemma concerns about the behavior of a learning rule A on neighboring training sets. A
is a regularized learning rule: Its objective function is in the form of empirical risk LS(w) plus regularization
error %(w) (%(·) is called a regularizer). More specifically, this lemma upper bounds the difference between the
objective values of u and v, that is ϑS(u) and ϑS(v), in terms of instance losses on the specific two instances
that get exchanged.
Recall that our goal is to upper bound ‖u − v‖. The following lemma accomplishes this task by upper
bounding the norm of the difference by the difference of the objective values of u and v.
Lemma 13. Let A be a rule where A(S) = arg minw ϑS(w) and ϑS(w) is λ-strongly convex in w. Then for
any S ∼ Dn, i ∈ [n] and z′ ∼ D, λ2 ‖u− v‖2 ≤ ϑS(u)− ϑS(v), where u = A(S(i)), v = A(S).
To see this Lemma, we note that v is a minimizer of ϑS by the definition of the learning rule. Therefore
by the definition of strong convexity, we have that for any α > 0,
ϑS(v) ≤ ϑS((1− α)v + αu)
≤ αϑ(v) + (1− α)ϑ(u)− λ
2
α(1− α)‖u− v‖2
1 For simplicity, ‖ · ‖ refers to `2-norm in the rest of the paper. Our results are applicable to other settings as long as
perturbation is properly defined on the normed space.
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The lemma is then proved by rearranging and tending α to 1. Intuitively, this lemma says that as long as the
objective function ϑS(w) of A is good (that is, strongly convex), then one can upper bound the difference
between u and v in norm by the difference between the objective values of u and v. Combining these two
lemmas, we can prove the following main theorem in this section.
Theorem 14. Let A be a learning rule with a λ-strongly convex objective loss function ϑS(w) = LS(w)+%(w)
where %(w) is a regularizer. Assume further that for any z ∈ Z, `(·, z) is ρ-Lipschitz. Then A is 4ρλn `2-RO
stable.
This theorem says that if both the instance loss function and the objective function are well behaved
(` is ρ-Lipschitz and ϑ is strongly convex), then the learning rule A is roughly (1/n)-norm stable (in other
words, the sensitivity is 1/n, which vanishes to 0 as training set size n grows). In the case when ` is already
λ-strongly convex, we do not need a regularizer so one can set %(w) = 0, hence a natural algorithm to ensure
differential privacy in this case is to directly perturb the empirical risk minimizer with noise calibrated to
its norm stability. Our discussion so far thus leads to Algorithm 1
Input: Privacy budget: εp > 0. Training set S = {(xi, yi)}ni=1.
Output: A hypothesis w.
1 Solve the empirical risk minimization w¯ = arg minw LS(w).
2 Draw a noise vector κ ∈ Rd according to a distribution with density function p(κ) ∝ exp
(
−λnεp‖κ‖24ρ
)
.
3 Output w¯ + κ.
Algorithm 1: Output Perturbation for strongly-convex loss function: `(w, z) is λ-strongly convex and
ρ-Lipschitz in w, for every z ∈ Z.
Theorem 15. Let (Z,H, `) be a learning problem where ` is λ-strongly convex and ρ-Lipschitz. Then
Algorithm 1 is ε-differentially private.
To see this, we note that LS(w) is λ-strongly convex because ` is, so we can set the objective function
ϑ(w) = LS(w). ϑ(w) is λ-strongly convex and ρ-Lipschitz, so Theorem 14 bounds its `2-norm stability. The
proof is then completed by plugging the stability bound into Theorem 8.
If the loss function is only convex (instead of being strongly convex), then the idea is to use a strongly con-
vex regularizer to make the objective function strongly convex. Specifically, we use the Tikhonov regularizer
%(w) = λ‖w‖2/2 (indeed, any strongly convex regularizer applies). This gives Algorithm 2.
Input: Privacy budget: εp > 0. Regularization parameter: λ > 0. Boundedness parameter: R > 0.
Training data: S = {(xi, yi)}ni=1.
Output: A hypothesis w.
1 Solve the regularized empirical risk minimization problem w¯ = arg min‖w‖≤R
(
LS(w) +
λ
2 ‖w‖2
)
.
2 Draw a noise vector κ ∈ Rd according to a distribution where p(κ) ∝ exp
(
−λnεp‖κ‖24(ρ+λR)
)
.
3 Output w¯ + κ.
Algorithm 2: Output Perturbation for general-convex loss function: `(w, z) is convex and ρ-Lipschitz
in w, for every z ∈ Z.
Theorem 16. Let (Z,H, `) be a learning problem where ` is convex and ρ-Lipschitz. Suppose further that
the hypothesis space is H is R-bounded. Then Algorithm 2 is ε-differentially private.
The easiest way to see this theorem is to define a new loss function ¯`(w, z) = `(w, z) + (λ‖w‖2)/2. Then
¯` is λ-strongly convex and (ρ + λR)-Lipschitz over H, and the theorem directly follows from Theorem 15.
We remark that Algorithm 2 and Theorem 16 can be strengthened based on Theorem 14 and specifically do
not rely on the boundedness condition. However, since our analysis of generalization error for this case (in
the next section) critically relies on the boundedness condition, the algorithm and its privacy guarantee are
stated in the current form.
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3.3 Generalization Error
Until now, we have only talked about ensuring differential privacy with a small amount of noise, and have
not said anything about whether this small amount of noise will lead to a model with “good utility”, which
is usually measured by generalization error in learning theory. We accomplish this in this section. At a high
level, we will show that for strongly convex learning tasks, output perturbation produces hypotheses that
are roughly (1/n)-away from the optimal. For general convex learning tasks, this degrades to roughly 1/
√
n.
For notational convenience, throughout this section we let A denote a deterministic learning mechanism,
and A˜ be its output perturbation counterpart. We begin with a general lemma.
Lemma 17. Suppose that for any z ∼ D, `(w, z) is ρ-Lipschitz in w. If with probability at least 1− γ over
w ∼ A˜(S),
‖w −A(S)‖2 ≤ κ(n, γ), 2
then with probability at least 1− γ over w ∼ A˜(S),
|LD(w)− LD(A(S))| ≤ ρκ(n, γ).
This lemma translates the closeness between two hypotheses in norm to the closeness in generalization
error. More specifically, note that the randomized learning rule A˜ induces a distribution A˜(S) over the
hypothesis space. This lemma says as long as a hypothesis sampled from A˜(S) is close to A(S) (a single
hypothesis) in norm, then these two hypotheses are close in their generalization error. Note that this
closeness is controlled by the Lipschitz constant of the instance loss function `.
Combing this lemma with Theorem 14 from the last section, which bounds the norm stability, we have
the following general theorem upper bounding the generalization error of our method.
Theorem 18. Let (H, Z, `) be a learning problem that is agnostically learnable by a deterministic learning
algorithm A with rate ε(n, δ). Suppose that `(w, z) is ρ-Lipschitz in w for any z ∈ Z. Let D be a distribution
over Z. Finally, suppose that for any S ∼ Dn, with probability at least 1− γ over w ∼ A˜(S),
‖w −A(S)‖2 ≤ κ(n, γ).
Then with probability at least 1−δ−γ over S ∼ Dn and w ∼ A˜(S), we have LD(w)−L∗D ≤ ε(n, δ)+ρκ(n, γ).
In the rest of this section we give concrete bounds for different types of instance loss function.
Strongly Convex Loss. We now bound generalization error of our method for the case where the instance
loss function ` is strongly convex. We will use the following theorem from stability theory:
Theorem 19 (Theorem 6, [25]). Consider a learning problem such that `(w, z) is λ-strongly convex and
ρ-Lipschitz in w. Then for any distribution D over Z and any δ > 0, with probability at least 1 − δ over
S ∼ Dn,
LD(ERM(S))− L∗D ≤
4ρ2
δλn
.
where ERM(S) is the empirical risk minimizer, i.e. ERM(S) = arg minw∈H LS(w).
We are ready to prove the following theorem on generalization error. Our bound matches the bound
obtained by Bassily et al. for the same setting (Theorem F.2, [3]).
Theorem 20. Consider a learning problem such that `(w, z) is λ-strongly convex and ρ-Lipschitz in w. Let
εp > 0 be a privacy parameter for differential privacy. Let A˜ denote Algorithm 1. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1),
with probability 1− δ over S ∼ Dn and w ∼ A˜(S),
LD(w)− L∗D ≤ O
(ρ2d ln(d/δ)
λnδεp
)
.
2We abuse the notation κ to remind readers that this quantity is related to the noise vector.
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Basically, this theorem says that if the instance loss function is strongly convex, then with high proba-
bility, the generalization error of a hypothesis sampled using our method is only roughly 1/n-away from the
“optimal” (L∗D).
General Convex Loss. We now consider the general case where ` is only convex. We have the following
theorem on the generalization error, which matches the bound obtained in [3] (Theorem F.3),
Theorem 21. Consider a convex, ρ-Lipschitz learning problem that is also R-bounded. Let εp > 0 be
a privacy parameter for differential privacy. Let A˜ denote Algorithm 2. Then for any δ ∈ (0, 1), with
probability 1− δ over S ∼ Dn and w ∼ A˜(S),
LD(w)− L∗D ≤ O
(
ρR
√
d ln(d/δ)√
nδεp
)
.
Note that for convex loss functions (instead of strongly convex ones), we are only roughly 1/
√
n-away
from the optimal.
We notice that regularization plays a vital role in this theoretical guarantee. Indeed, the key to prove
Theorem 21 is the use of the Tikhonov regularizer (λ‖w‖2/2) to gain stability. By contrast, regularization
is only used as a heuristic in the analysis of the functional mechanism [33].
4 Applications
In this section we give concrete applications of the theory developed so far. Along the way, we compare
our method with previous ones. To begin with, Chaudhuri et al. [5] have given an output perturbation
mechanism that is essentially the same as our Algorithm 2. Moreover, they give an objective perturbation
algorithm. The main difference is that the noise is added to the objective function, instead of the output.
Algorithm 3 describes their objective perturbation algorithm. We refer interested readers to their work for
more details.
Input: Privacy budget: εp > 0. Parameters λ, c > 0. Boundedness parameter: R > 0. Training data:
S = {(xi, yi)}ni=1.
Output: A hypothesis w.
1 Let ε′p = εp − log(1 + 2cnλ + c
2
n2λ2 ).
2 If ε′p > 0, then ∆ = 0, else ∆ =
c
n(eεp/4)−1 − λ, and ε′p = εp/2.
3 Put β = εp/2 and draw noise vector ν such that p(ν) ∝ e−β‖ν‖.
4 Output arg min‖w‖≤R
{
LS(w) +
νTw
n +
λ‖w‖2
2
}
.
Algorithm 3: Objective Perturbation of Chaudhuri et al.
Our work differs in analysis and applicability. Specifically, to get their claimed generalization bounds
Chaudhuri et al. requires differentiability and the Lipschitz derivative for their output perturbation, and
requires twice differentiability with bounded derivatives for their objective perturbation (see Theorem 6 and
Theorem 9 in [5]). Our analysis removes all these differentiability conditions, and demonstrates that output
perturbation works well for all convex-Lipschitz-bounded learning problems. This is by far the largest class
of convex learning problems that are known to be learnable (see [24]). Due to lack of space, in the following
we only give two important examples, Support Vector Machine and Logistic Regression. As we will see, our
analysis enables us to train an SVM without approximating the loss function using a smooth loss function
that gives higher or equal loss point-wisely.
Support Vector Machine (SVM). In SVM the instance-loss function is the so called hinge loss function.
Specifically, given hypothesis space H ⊆ Rd, feature space X ⊆ Rd, and output space Y = {0, 1}, then for
(x, y) ∈ X × Y , the hinge loss is defined as
`hinge(w, x, y) = max
{
0, y(1− 〈w, x〉)}.
10
In the common setting where X is scaled to lie within the unit ball, it is straightforward to verify that
`hinge is convex 1-Lipschitz. Therefore our Algorithm 2 and Theorem 21 directly apply to give differential
privacy with a small generalization error. We note that, however, hinge loss is not differentiable. Therefore
Chaudhuri et al.’s analysis for output perturbation does not directly apply. Indeed, in order to use their
method, they need to use a smooth loss function to approximate the hinge loss by giving higher or equal
loss point-wisely.
Logistic Regression. In the Logistic Regression we have H ⊆ Rd, X ⊆ Rd and Y = {±1}. Then for y ∈ Y
and x ∈ X, the loss of w on (x, y) is defined to be
`log(w, x, y) = log
(
1 + e−y〈w,x〉
)
.
It is not hard to verify that `log is convex and differentiable with bounded derivatives. Therefore both our
analysis and Chaudhuri et al.’s analysis directly apply. In particular, Chaudhuri et al. [5] has done extensive
experiments evaluating output perturbation for Logistic Regression on standard datasets.
4.1 On Setting Parameters, Generalization Error and Implementation
We note that, very recently, Bassily et al. [3] have given better training error under the same technical
conditions as ours (the generalization error is the same). Next we compare with theirs.
On one hand, we observe that [3, 5], as well as our work, are all based on regularized learning, and the
regularization parameter λ is left unspecified. Because the requirement of differential privacy, one cannot
na¨ıvely run the regularized learning on multiple training sets and then pick the best parameters: Our analysis
of DP is with respect to the training data only; however, if the parameters we pick depend on the data, then
they may carry sensitive information of individuals in the data, which renders the subsequent DP analysis
invalid. A standard way to tackle this issue is to employ private parameter tuning, which acts as a wrapper
procedure, that invokes the regularized learning procedure as a black box, and pick parameters differentially
privately for the regularized learning. In this paper we also consider a data independent approach based on
our analysis.
On the other hand, for fixed λ the regularized learning procedure of Bassily et al. [3] achieves better
training error (the generalization error remains the same). However, their mechanisms are substantially
more complicated. More specifically, their mechanism requires a sophisticated sampling procedure that runs
in time O(n3), where n is the training set size. For reasonably large data sets this can be prohibitive. An
even more serious concern is some practical challenges in implementing this sampling procedure, which dates
back to work of Applegate and Kannan [2]. Indeed, we noticed that similar concern in implementing related
sampling procedures have also been raised by Hardt [12]. Given these concerns, we will not empirically
compare with Bassily et al.’s mechanisms.
4.2 Linear Regression
In the rest of this paper, we specialize the general algorithms to linear regression, which is a common
regression task and is the model which Fredrikson et al. [11] constructed from a medical data set. We will
evaluate the effectiveness of our private linear regression mechanisms presented here in an empirical study
later.
Technically, let d be the number of features, H ⊆ Rd, X ⊆ Rd and Y ⊆ R. Linear regression uses the so
called “squared loss” instance-loss function, `(w, (x, y)) = (〈w, x〉 − y)2. Note that ` is convex in w for any
fixed (x, y). Unfortunately, it is known in the learning theory that the learning task with respect to ` (that
is, to minimize ED[`(w,D)] over w ∈ H) is not learnable over Rd (see Example 12.8, Shalev-Shwartz and
Ben-David [24].). To gain theoretical tractability, we thus restrict the hypothesis space H to be R-bounded.
With this restriction, ` is then (2R+ 2)-Lipschitz over H. Thus we can specialize Algorithm 2 to get rls-out
described in Algorithm 4.
Note that rls-out has two unspecified parameters λ and R. We use two approaches to tackle the issue of
picking these parameter privately: The first is to use a computation based on our analysis to pick parameters
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Input: Privacy budget: εp > 0. Regularization parameter: λ > 0. Boundedness parameter: R > 0.
Training data: S = {(xi, yi)}ni=1, where ‖xi‖ ≤ 1 and |yi| ≤ 1.
Output: A hypothesis w.
1 Solve the regularized least mean square problem
w¯ = arg min
‖w‖≤R
(
LS(w) +
λ
2
‖w‖2
)
.
2 Draw a noise vector κ ∈ Rd according to a distribution with the following density function p(κ),
p(κ) ∝ exp
(
−λnε‖κ‖2
12R+ 8
)
.
3 Output w¯ + κ.
Algorithm 4: rls-out
in a data independent manner. The second approach uses a private parameter tuning algorithm (Section
6, [5]). We are ready to describe all the private linear regression mechanisms considered in this paper and
explain on how to choose parameters. In the following, similar to previous work [5, 33], we assume that the
training data is scaled so that they lie in the unit ball.
Oracle Output Perturbation. This is the idealized version of the output perturbation mechanism, where
we exhaustively search for the best parameters using the training data and then use them in as if they were
“constants”. We consider this variant because it shows the best possible result one can obtain using output
perturbation.
We search R exhaustively within the space {0.25, 0.5, 1, 2}. To search for a good λ, we consider an
arithmetic progression starting at initial value (d/nε′p)
1/2 and ending at (d/nε∗p)
1/2, where ε′p = 100 and
ε∗p = 0.1. The start and end values are determined by a computation based on our proof of Theorem 21. For
our dataset on warfarin dosage, n ≈ 3000 and d = 14. This gives the approximate range [0.007, 0.2]. We use
a slightly larger range [0.001, 0.5].
Data-Independent Output Perturbation. Based on the proof of Theorem 21, We determine λ,R
through a computation so that they are independent of the training data.
We put R = 1. This is because we scale the data to be within the unit ball, and the coefficients of the
linear regression model are all small when trained over the scaled data. For λ, we pick it using our theoretical
analysis for output perturbation. Specifically, Theorem 21 indicates that λ is approximately
√
d/nεp.
Privately-Tuned Output/Objective Perturbation. Chaudhuri et al. [5] use private parameter tuning
to pick data-dependent parameters for both of their output/objective perturbation. Fortunately, the private
tuning algorithm only makes black-box use of the output/objective perturbation. Algorithm 5 describes the
private-tuning framework. Given εp, the tuning algorithm ensures εp-DP.
Let R be a set of l choices of R and Λ be a set of k choices of λ. Let m = l · k, and suppose the pairs
of parameters can be listed as {(R1, λ1), . . . , (Rm, λm)}. The more settings of parameters to try, larger the
m is, and so we have smaller chunks for training, thus more entropy in the probability in picking the final
hypothesis. Therefore, we want to have a small set of good parameters. We put Λ as a geometric progression
of ratio 2 that starts with 0.002 and ends with 0.256 = 0.002 · 27, so k = 8. For R, note that while we may
want larger radius for the purpose of learning, the probability we assign to each wi decays quadratically in
R. We thus try two sets R1 = {.25, .5, 1}, and R2 = {.5, 1, 2}, so l = 3. For R1, the probability sampling wi
becomes exp(−LS′(wi)εp/2). For R2, this is exp(−LS′(wi)εp/8).
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Input: Privacy budget: εp > 0.
Training data: S = {(xi, yi)}ni=1, where ‖xi‖ ≤ 1, |yi| ≤ 1.
Parameter space: R = {R1, . . . , Rl}, where max1≤i≤lRi ≤ R, Λ = {λ1, . . . , λk}. Let
R× Λ = {(Ri, λi)}mi=1
Output: A hypothesis w.
1 Divide the training data into m+ 1 chunks, S1, . . . , Sm, S
′. S1, . . . , Sm are used for training, and S′ is
used for validation.
2 For each i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, apply a privacy-preserving algorithm to train wi (for example output or
objective perturbation) with parameters εp, λi, Ri, Si. Evaluate wi on S
′ to get utility
uS′(wi) = −LS′(wi).
3 Pick a wi in {w1, . . . , wm} using the exponential mechanism with privacy budget εp and utility
function uS′(wi). Note that the sensitivity of u is
∆(u) = max
w∈H
max
S,i,z′
|uS(w)− uS(i)(w)| ≤ R2.
Thus this amounts to sampling wi with probability
p(wi) ∝ exp
(
−LS′(wi)εp
2R2
)
.
Algorithm 5: Parameter Tuning Algorithm: it accesses a privacy-preserving training algorithm as a
black box.
5 Empirical Study
In this section we evaluate our mechanisms on the warfarin-dosing dataset used by Fredrikson et al. [11].
We are interested in the following questions:
1. How does the accuracy of models produced using our mechanisms compare to the functional mecha-
nism?
2. What is the impact of improved DP-utility tradeoff on MI attacks?
In summary, we found that: 1) our mechanisms provide better accuracy than the functional mechanism, for
a given  setting, and 2) this improvement in model accuracy makes MI attacks more effective. Specifically,
we obtain accurate models with ε-DP even for ε = 0.1, whereas the functional mechanism does not provide
comparable models until ε ≥ 5.
Section 5.1 describes our experimental methodology, and Section 5.2 presents our results on the relation-
ship between ε and model accuracy. In Section 5.3, we present empirical evidence and a formal analysis of
our observation that better differentially-private mechanisms lead to more effective MI attacks.
5.1 Methodology
We used the same methodology, data, and training/validation split as the experiments discussed in Fredrikson
et al. [11]. The data was collected by the International Warfarin Pharmacogenetics Consortium (IWPC), and
contains information pertaining to the age, height, weight, race, partial medical history, and two genomic
SNPs: VKORC1 and CYP2C9. The outcome variable corresponds to the stable therepeutic dose of warfarin,
defined as the steady-state dose that led to stable anticoagulation levels. At the time of collection, this was the
most expansive database of information relevant to pharmacogenomic warfarin dosing. For more information
about the data and how it was pre-processed, we refer the reader to the original IWPC paper [14] and the
paper by Fredrikson et al. [11].
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Our experiments examine linear warfarin dosing models trained on this data, either using differentially-
private regression mechanisms or standard linear regression, and seek to characterize the relationship between
the following quantities:
Privacy budget. This is given by the parameter , and controls the “strength” of the guarantee conferred
by differential privacy. Smaller privacy budgets correspond to stronger guarantees.
Model accuracy/utility. We measure this as the average mean-squared error between the model’s pre-
dicted warfarin dose, and the ground truth given in the validation set. To obtain a more realistic measure
of utility, we use the approach described by Fredrikson et al. [11] to simulate the physiological response of
patients who are are given warfarin dosages according to the model, and estimate the likelihood of adverse
health events (stroke, hemorrhage, and mortality).
Model invertability. This is measured by the success rate of the model inversion algorithm described
by Fredrikson et al. [11], when predicting VKORC1 for each patient in the validation set. We focused on
VKORC1 rather than CYP2C9, as Fredrikson et al. showed that the results for this SNP more clearly
illustrate the trade-off between privacy and utility.
The rest of this section describes our results for each quantity.
5.2 Model Accuracy
Figure 1 compares Functional Mechanism with all the private output perturbation mechanisms, which in-
cludes Tuned Output Perturbation (Out), Data-Independent Output Perturbation (Data Independent), and
Oracle Output Perturbation (Oracle). We also include the model accuracy of the non-private algorithm
(Non-Private). We observe that all the output perturbation give much better model accuracy compared to
the functional mechanism, especially for small ε. Specifically, Tuned Output Perturbation obtains accurate
models at ε = 0.3. Data-Independent and the Oracle Mechanisms give much the same model accuracy, and
provide accurate models even for ε = 0.1. In particular, the accuracy is very close to the models produced
by the non-private algorithm.
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Figure 1: Model Accuracy: compare the functional mechanism with our output perturbation method, as
well as the non-private mechanism. R1 stands for the Private-Tuned mechanism where we try the bounded
hypothesis space with radius R in {.25, .5, 1}. R2 stands for the same mechanism with radius in {.5, 1, 2}.
Out indicates Privately Tuned Output Perturbation methods. Oracle (Data-Independent) stands for the
Oracle (Data-Independent) Output Perturbation.
Figure 2 further compares the performance of Data-Independent and Oracle mechanisms and demonstrate
their closeness. For the entire parameter range considered, the maximum MSE gap we observed is only 0.1.
Figure 3 further compares the risk of mortality, hemorrhage, and stroke using Functional Mechanism, Tuned
Output Perturbation and Data-Independent Output Perturbation. unsurprisingly, Data-Independent Output
Perturbation gives the best result, and in particular much smaller risk than Functional Mechanism.
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Figure 2: Model Accuracy: Further comparison between Data-Independent Output Perturbation and Oracle
Output Perturbation. The maximum MSE gap we observed is only 0.1.
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Figure 3: Model Risk: We estimate the risk of mortality, hemorrhage, and stroke using the approach described
by Fredrikson et al.
Comparison with Other Private Mechanisms. We also compare model accuracy of our method with
two other private algorithms.
Projected Histogram. We notice that in the previous work of Fredrikson et al. [11], they have imple-
mented private projected histogram mechanism and compared it with the functional mechanism on linear
regression. Specifically, as Figure 6 (Section 5.2) of their paper shows, the projected-histogram algorithm
indeed has similar model accuracy compared to the functional mechanism, which is much worse than our
Data-Independent algorithm (of which the accuracy is close to that of the non-private algorithm).
Objective Perturbation. We have so far mainly compared with the function mechanism, which we
believe is the most important task, because the functional mechanism has become the recognized state of
the art for training regression models and has been adopted by many research teams, including [1, 29, 30].
On the other hand, we notice that under very restricted conditions, it is known that Chaudhuri et al.’s
objective perturbation method [5] can provide very good model accuracy. Interestingly, because we impose
boundedness condition for linear regression, the technical conditions of objective perturbation are satisfied.
Therefore we also compare it with our method. Encouragingly and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, while our
method is much more widely applicable (see discussion in Section 4), our experiments show that our general
algorithm performs as well as objective perturbation. Specifically, Figure 4 compares the model accuracy of
these three methods, and the maximal gap we observed is only 0.1!
5.3 Model Inversion
In this section, we examine the impact of the increased model utility on model inversion (MI), a privacy
attack first raised by Fredrikson et al. [11]. Improving model utility for a given ε is a theme shared by nearly
all previous work on differential privacy. This is a sensible goal, because utility has no direct bearing on
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Figure 4: Model Accuracy: Objective Perturbation, Data-Independent Output Perturbation and Oracle
Output Perturbation. R1 stands for the Private-Tuned mechanism where we try the bounded hypothesis
space with radius R in {.25, .5, 1}. R2 stands for the same mechanism with radius in {.5, 1, 2}.
the privacy guarantee provided by differential-privacy—two models can differ significantly on the level of
utility the provide, while still conferring the same level of differential privacy. However, we show that MI is
orthogonal to differential privacy in this sense, because the improved utility offered by our mechanisms leads
to more successful MI attacks.
Better DP mechanisms, more effective MI attacks. Figure 5 compares MI accuracy of all the private
mechanisms. For all these mechanisms, we see that mechanisms with better DP-utility tradeoff also has
higher MI accuracy. Specifically, For Oracle Output Perturbation at ε = 0.2, we see a significant increase
in MI accuracy: 45% for Oracle compared to 35% for the functional mechanism. Meanwhile, the utility of
our mechanism is much better, with mean squared error 1.82 compared to the functional mechanism’s 22.57.
This phenomenon holds for larger ε, although the magnitude of the differences gradually shrink.
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Figure 5: MI attack: Output Perturbation vs. Functional Mechanism. The x-axis is ε. The y-axis is
the accuracy of MI attack. MI attacks become more effective for all three variants. For Oracle Output
Perturbation and Functional Mechanism at ε = .2, the MI attack accuracy for the oracle mechanism is 45%,
while is only 35% for the functional mechanism. Data-Independent and Oracle Output Perturbation are
similar.
Figure 6 further demonstrates that, similar to their model accuracy, Data-Independent and Oracle Output
Perturbation have very similar behavior on model invertibility (note that they both provide similar model
accuracy that is better than other methods).
Comparison with Other Private Mechanisms. For MI we also compare our method with projected-
histogram algorithm and objective perturbation. Specifically, We notice that in the previous work of Fredrik-
son et al. [11], they have demonstrated that projected-histogram algorithm actually leaks more information
and produces models with higher MI accuracy than the functional mechanism (see the discussion under the
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Figure 6: Model Invertibility: Data-Independent and Oracle Output Perturbation. The model inversion
accuracy of these two algorithms are also very close with each other.
head “Private Histograms vs. Linear Regression” in Section 4 of their paper). For Objective Pertur-
bation we find again that its MI accuracy is almost the same as our Data-Independent and Oracle Output
Perturbation. This is not surprising because they have very close model accuracy.
For a fixed mechanism, better utility gives more effective MI attacks. For a fixed mechanism,
we demonstrate that MI attacks get more effective as utility increases with the availability of more training
data. Figure 7 shows the results for Tuned Output Perturbation. For εp = 0.5, the mean square error drops
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Figure 7: Privately-Tuned Output Perturbation with increasingly larger training sets. The x-axis is the
size of training chunks, and the y-axis is MSE. We use the following experimental method: The entire data
set gets randomly permuted in the beginning. The data is split again into 25 chunks, with the first 24 for
training and the last one for validation. For each of the training chunks, a fraction of the training items is
sampled at rate r. We then train the model using the data with Tuned Output Perturbation and evaluate
their utility and MI attack accuracy. This experiment is repeated 100 time for r = 10%, 20%, . . . , 100%.
from 5.05 (with r = 10% of available training data) to 2.9 (r = 90%), while the MI attack accuracy increases
from 36% (r = 10%) to 40% (r = 90%).
A Theoretical Analysis. At first sight the above two phenomena may seem somewhat peculiar. If MI
attack is considered as a privacy concern, then we have empirically observed that some privacy concern
becomes “worse”, while differential privacy gets “better.”
There is no contradiction here. Indeed, it suffices to observe that DP is a property of the learning
“process”, while MI attack is on the “result” of the process. It is thus valid that the process satisfies a strong
privacy guarantee, while the result has some other concerns. In the following, we give a “lower bound”
result, which shows that, as long as the optimal solution of the learning problem is susceptible to MI attacks,
improving DP/utility tradeoff will give effective MI attacks “eventually.”
The intuition is as follows: Suppose that MI attack will be effective at a hypothesis w∗ such that
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LD(w∗) = L∗D. That is, the MI attack is effective at a hypothesis we want to converge to. Now, suppose
that the effectiveness of MI attack grows “monotonically” as we converge to w∗. Then, as long as the result
of a learning algorithm converges to w∗, it will gradually give more effective MI attacks. We now give more
details of this argument.
Assumptions. We make the following three assumptions on learning and MI attack: (i) The utility of a
hypothesis is measured by its generalization error. (ii) Suppose that for w∗, LD(w∗) = L∗D, and MI attack
is effective for w∗. (iii) As |LD(w)− L∗D| gets smaller, the MI attack for w becomes more effective.
These assumptions are natural. For (i), almost all previous work measures utility this way. For (ii),
since the ultimate goal of learning is to converge to the best possible hypothesis, assuming MI attack will be
effective for such w∗ is natural. Finally, closeness in LD indicates that w and w∗ are close in terms of their
“functioning as a model.” Thus (iii) holds intuitively.
Better DP Mechanisms, More Effective MI attack. For any n, let Sn denote a training set of size
n. Suppose that A′ is an εp-differentially private mechanism with better privacy-utility tradeoff than the
output perturbation mechanism A. Thus with high probability for w ∼ A′(Sn), LD(w) is closer to L∗D than
that of w sampled from A(Sn). Combined with (ii) and (iii), we have that MI attack is more effective for
w ∼ A′(Sn).
One may note that the mechanism A′ could be any differentially private mechanism, as long as it has
better DP-utility tradeoff than output perturbation. For example, one can use the objective perturbation
mechanism in [5] for generalized linear models, or exponential sampling based mechanisms in [3] if minimizing
training error is the goal.
For a Fixed Mechanism, Better DP-Utility tradeoff gives More Effective MI attacks.. Theo-
rem 14 and our discussion at the end of Section 3.2 have indicated that as n tends to the infinity, the amount
of noise injected for εp-differential privacy vanishes to zero. Further, Theorem 20 and 21 imply that for any
convex Lipschitz learning problem, the output perturbation mechanism converges to the optimal hypothesis
w∗. Thus we are in the situation that as n increases, the output model has less noise yet it is closer to w∗.
Therefore, by assumptions (ii) and (iii) MI attack is more effective for larger n.
A Bayesian View Point. In a paper by Kasiviswanathan and Smith [17], the authors give a Bayesian
interpretation of the semantics of differential privacy. Informally speaking, given an arbitrary prior distri-
bution over a collection of databases, what differential privacy guarantees is that two posteriors obtained in
two worlds of neighboring databases are indistinguishable with each other.
What about the difference between prior and posterior? The same paper [17], and indeed the original
paper by Dwork and Naor[9], have pointed out that it is impossible to bound the difference between prior
and posterior under arbitrary background knowledge. Essentially, as long as the published information is
“useful,” there exists some background knowledge that allows an adversary to learn and significantly modify
his/her prior.
Unfortunately, in MI attacks, some moderate background information allows significant change of one’s
prior. Therefore, while worsening MI attack is certainly not what one intended, it is also of no surprise that
better differentially private mechanisms do not give better resilience against MI attack.
6 Related Work
Differential privacy was proposed in the seminal work of Dwork, McSherry, Nissim and Smith [8] and has
become the de-facto standard for privacy. Our setting – learning a model differentially privately – was
initiated in the work by Chaudhuri, Monteleoni and Sarwate [5]. Since the work of [5], a large body
of work [3, 5, 7, 15] has been devoted to this line, culminating in a recent result by Bassily, Smith and
Thakurta [3], which obtains tight error bounds for general convex-Lipschitz learning problems and generalized
linear models. To this end, our work makes the underlying theme behind these works more explicit, namely,
the connection between differential privacy and stability theory in machine learning.
On the other hand, the application of these results in practice seems slow-paced. The recent work by
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Fredrikson et al. [11] highlights two unfortunate facts on training a differentially private pharmacogenetic
model using the functional mechanism proposed by Zhang et al. [33]. The first issue is the low model
accuracy even for weak differential privacy guarantees. For this problem, we show, both theoretically and
empirically, that the simple output perturbation can provide a much better DP-utility tradeoff than the
functional mechanism.
The second issue is about effectiveness of MI attacks. MI attack is a new kind of privacy attack that
was first described in the same paper by Fredrikson et al. [11], where the authors demonstrate that a DP
mechanism can only prevent MI attack with small privacy parameters. We show that the privacy concern
of MI attack is essentially orthogonal to the concern of differential privacy. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first work that establishes such a connection.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we considered issues raised by Fredrikson et al. about training differentially private regres-
sion models using functional mechanism. Through an explicit connection between differential privacy and
stable learning theory, we gave a straightforward analysis showing that output perturbation can be made to
obtain, both theoretically and empirically, substantially better privacy/utility tradeoff than the functional
mechanism. Since output mechanism is simple to implement, this indicates that our method is potentially
widely applicable in practice. We went on to apply our theory to the same data set as used by Fredrikson
et al., and the empirical results are encouraging.
We also studied model inversion attack, a privacy attack raised in the same paper by Fredrikson et al.
We observed empirically that better differentially private mechanisms lead to more effective model-inversion
attacks. We analyzed theoretically why this is the case. We regard this result as a warning that care may
be taken when learning things from a data set, even when strong differential privacy is guaranteed.
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A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. Let fS(w) be the probability density function of A(S). Due to ε-differential privacy, then for any
S, i, z′, fS(w) ≤ eεfS(i)(w). Therefore ∣∣∣E[`(A˜(S), z¯)]− E[`(A˜(S(i)), z¯)]∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∫ `(w, z¯)(fS(w)− fS(i)(w))dw∣∣∣∣
≤
∫
|`(w, z¯)||fS(w)− fS(i)(w)|dw
≤B
∫
|fS(w)− fS(i)(w)|dw (1)
Note that (e−ε− 1)fS(i)(w) ≤ fS(w)− fS(i)(w) ≤ (eε− 1)fS(i)(w), so |fS(w)− fS(i)(w)| ≤ max{1− e−ε, eε−
1}fS(i)(w). Plugging into (1) gives the first claimed inequality. The second inequality follows from the
observation that eε + e−ε ≥ 2.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 12
Proof. By the definition of ϑS ,
ϑS(u)− ϑS(v)
=
(
LS(i)(u) + %(u)−
1
n
`(u, z′) +
1
n
`(u, zi)
)
−
(
LS(i)(v) + %(v)−
1
n
`(v, z′) +
1
n
`(v, zi)
)
= ϑS(i)(u)− ϑS(i)(v) +
`(v, z′)− `(u, z′)
n
+
`(u, zi)− `(v, zi)
n
.
Since u minimizes ϑS(i) so ϑS(i)(u)− ϑS(i)(v) ≤ 0, so
ϑS(u)− ϑS(v) ≤ `(v, z
′)− `(u, z′)
n
+
`(u, zi)− `(v, zi)
n
completing the proof.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 13
Proof. We have that for any α ∈ (0, 1),
ϑS(v) ≤ ϑS(αv + (1− α)u)
≤ αϑS(v) + (1− α)ϑS(u)− λ
2
α(1− α)‖v − u‖2
where the first inequality is because v is the minimizer of ϑS and the second inequality is by the definition
of λ-strong convexity. By elementary algebra, this give that λ2α‖v − u‖2 ≤ ϑS(u) − ϑS(v). Tending α to 1
gives the claim.
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A.4 Proof of Theorem 14
Proof. Let u = A(S(i)), v = A(S). By Lemma 13,
λ
2
‖u− v‖2 ≤ ϑS(u)− ϑS(v) (1)
By Lemma 12,
ϑS(u)− ϑS(v) ≤ `(v, z
′)− `(u, z′)
n
+
`(u, zi)− `(v, zi)
n
(2)
Now because `(·, z) is ρ-Lipschitz, we have that `(v, z′)−`(u, z′) ≤ ρ‖v−u‖, and `(u, zi)−`(v, zi) ≤ ρ‖u−v‖.
Plugging these two inequalities to (2), we have that ϑS(u) − ϑS(v) ≤ 2ρn ‖u − v‖. Plugging this to (1) and
rearranging completes the proof.
A.5 Proof of Lemma 17
Proof. We have
|LD(w)− LD(A(S))| = | E
z∼D
[`(w, z)− `(A(S), z)]|
≤ E
z∼D
[|`(w, z)− `(A(S), z)|]
For every z ∈ Z, `(·, z) is ρ-Lipschitz, so |`(w, z)− `(A(S), z)| ≤ ρ‖w −A(S)‖2. Therefore
E
z∼D
[|`(w, z)− `(A(S), z)|] ≤ ρ‖w −A(S)‖2.
The proof is complete by observing that with probability at least 1 − γ over w ∼ A˜(S), ‖w − A(S)‖2 ≤
κ(n, γ).
A.6 Proof of Theorem 18
Proof. For any S ∼ Dn, we have that LD(w) − L∗D =
(
LD(w) − LD(A(S))
)
+
(
LD(A(S)) − L∗D
)
. For
LD(A(S)) − L∗D, we know that PrS∼Dn
[
LD(A(S)) − L∗D > ε(n, δ)
]
< δ. Further, for every S ∼ Dn, from
Lemma 17, Prw∼A˜(S)
[
LD(w)− LD(A(S)) > ρκ(n, γ)
]
< γ. The proof is complete by a union bound.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 20
Proof. Let A denote the rule of empirical risk minimization, and A˜ be its output-perturbation counter-part
which ensures εp-differential privacy. Then by Theorem 14, and corollary 9, with probability at least 1− γ
over w ∼ A˜(S), ‖w −A(S)‖2 ≤ 4d ln(d/γ)ρλnεp .
Together with Theorem 19, it follows that with probability at least 1−δ′−γ over S ∼ Dn and w ∼ A˜(S),
LD(w)− L∗D ≤
4ρ2
δ′λn
+
4d ln(d/γ)ρ2
λnεp
.
Put δ′ = γ = δ/2, thus with probability at least 1− δ,
LD(w)− L∗D ≤
4ρ2
λn
(2
δ
+
4d ln(2d/δ)
εp
)
.
Asymptotically this is O
(
ρ2d ln(d/δ)
λnδεp
)
. The proof is complete.
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A.8 Proof of Theorem 21
Proof. Let ¯` be defined as ¯`(w, z) = `(w, z) + λ2 ‖w‖2. ¯` is λ-strongly convex and (ρ + λR)-Lipschitz. Let
L¯S and L¯D be the empirical loss and true loss functions with respect to ¯`. Note that for any w ∈ H,
L¯D(w) = LD(w) + λ2 ‖w‖2.
By Theorem 20, there is an εp-differentially private mechanism A˜ such that with probability 1 − δ over
S ∼ Dn and w ∼ A˜(S),
L¯D(w)− L¯∗D ≤ O
( (ρ+ λR)2d ln(d/δ)
λnδεp
)
(1)
Let w¯ ∈ H such that L¯D(w¯) = L¯∗D and w∗ ∈ H such that L∗D = LD(w∗). Because w¯ is the minimizer of
L¯D(·), so
LD(w∗) +
λ
2
‖w∗‖2 ≥ LD(w¯) + λ
2
‖w¯‖2 (2)
Combining (1) and (2) we have
LD(w)− L∗D ≤ O
( (ρ+ λR)2d ln(d/δ)
λnδεp
)
+
λ
2
(‖w∗‖2 − ‖w‖2)
≤ O
( (ρ+ λR)2d ln(d/δ)
λnδεp
)
+
λR2
2
≤ O
(
2ρRd ln(d/δ)
nδεp
+
ρ2d ln(d/δ)
λnδεp
+ λR2
)
where the second inequality is because the hypothesis space is R-bounded. Putting λ = ρR
√
d ln(d/δ)
nδεp
gives
the claimed bound.
A.9 Smooth Problems
The following lemma bounds training error for smooth learning problems. The lemma is first proved by
Chaudhuri et al. [5] for generalized linear models.
Lemma 22. Consider a learning problem (H, Z, `). Suppose that ` is λ-strongly convex, ρ-Lipschitz, and
β-smooth. Let A be ERM and A˜ be its output perturbation variant as described in Algorithm 1 with privacy
parameter εp > 0. Then for any training set S ⊆ Zn, we have with probability at least 1− γ over w ∼ A˜(S),
LS(w)− LS(w∗) ≤ β
(
4d ln(d/γ)ρ
λnεp
)2
.
where LS(w
∗) = minw∈H LS(w).
Proof. Using Mean Value Theorem, we have that for some α ∈ (0, 1), LS(w) − LS(w∗) = ∇LS(αw + (1 −
α)w∗)(w − w∗), which is upper bounded by ‖∇LS(αw + (1 − α)w∗)‖‖w − w∗‖ by the Cauchy-Schwarz
inequality.
Note that w∗ achieves the minimum, so ∇LS(w∗) = 0. Thus ‖∇LS(αw+(1−α)w∗)‖ = ‖∇LS(αw+(1−
α)w∗) − ∇LS(w∗)‖, which is upper bounded by β‖α(w − w∗)‖ ≤ β‖w − w∗‖ because ∇LS is β-Lipschitz.
Therefore we have that LS(w)− LS(w∗) ≤ β‖w − w∗‖2.
Finally, note that with probability at least 1 − γ over w ∼ A˜(S), ‖w − w∗‖ ≤ 4d ln(d/γ)ρλnεp , so LS(w) −
LS(w
∗) ≤ β
(
4d ln(d/γ)ρ
λnεp
)2
.
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